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AN OBJECTIVE SOLUTION TO AN AMBIGUOUS
PROBLEM: DETERMINING THE OWNERSHIP OF
CLOSED CONTAINERS DURING A
CONSENSUAL SEARCH
INTRODUCTION
The police have long suspected Clemenza and Vito of running
guns.' During a stakeout, Officer McCluskey notices them talking
through the Windows of their respective apartments, which face each
other on opposite sides of an alley. He then sees Clemenza toss a bag
to Vito. The next day, Officer McCluskey arrives at Vito's apartment,
and a woman named Carmela answers the door. She explains that she
owns the apartment and gives Officer McCluskey her unqualified con-
sent to search it. After looking around, Officer McCluskey discovers
a spare bedroom and a closet strewn with men's and women's cloth-
ing, men's shoeboxes, and a backpack. Officer McCluskey opens the
backpack and discovers a cache of guns. If this hypothetical search
had taken place within the jurisdiction of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second or Seventh Circuits, Carmela's consent would have
likely extended to the backpack because it did not obviously and ex-
clusively belong to another; the guns would be admitted into evidence.
However, if the same search had taken place within the jurisdiction of
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, Officer McCluskey
would have had to discontinue his search upon finding the backpack
and cure the ambiguity surrounding the backpack's ownership; the ev-
idence would be suppressed.
When a police officer obtains consent to search a residence from an
individual who has the apparent authority to give it, that consent gen-
erally extends to containers within the premises that the officer rea-
sonably perceives as belonging to the consenting individual. 2
1. The anecdote and character names are inspired by THE GODFATHER PART II (Paramount
Pictures 1974), directed by Francis Ford Coppola.
2. E.g., Glenn v. Commonwealth, 642 S.E.2d 282, 285 (Va. Ct. App. 2007) ("A grant of con-
sent to search premises includes consent to search closed containers found within the premises
unless the officers have reliable information that the container is not under the control of the
person granting consent." (quoting 27 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACIiCE
$ 641.44 (3d ed. 2006))); see also State v. Odom, 722 N.W.2d 370, 373 (N.D. 2006) ("Specific
consent to search every container is not needed when consent to search a room is given." (citing
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991))).
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However, when an officer comes across a container of even mildly
ambiguous ownership, the circuit courts are split as to whether he may
proceed with the search.3 The Second and Seventh Circuits permit
the officer to search any containers that do not obviously belong to
someone other than the consenting party.4 This "obviousness" stan-
dard is an objective determination that examines whether a reasona-
ble officer would think that the container "obviously" and
"exclusively" belongs to another individual.5 The Sixth Circuit, how-
ever, requires the officer to discontinue his search and cure any ambi-
guity that he encounters. 6 This "ambiguity" standard is a subjective
determination that looks not only to the beliefs and intentions of the
officer, but also to the peculiarities of the factual circumstances. 7
This Comment argues that courts should follow the standard
adopted by the Second and Seventh Circuits and extend a resident's
open-ended consent to closed containers discovered within the prem-
ises, except for those that obviously do not belong to the resident.,
When an officer encounters some measure of ambiguity, courts should
not unreasonably impede his search-conducted under a resident's
blanket consent-by requiring additional ex ante clarification regard-
ing the container's ownership.9 Such a rule would essentially freeze
the legitimate exercise of police authority, spark an inestimable
amount of litigation over hairsplitting ambiguities, and make officers
unduly fearful of the unintended legal consequences lurking under
every lid.
This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part II provides a brief his-
tory of the Fourth Amendment and the apparent authority doctrine, a
summary of an individual's legitimate expectations of privacy in con-
tainers, and an overview of the split between the circuits regarding the
search of closed containers.10 Part III critiques the ambiguity stan-
dard employed in the Sixth Circuit and advocates for the obviousness
3. See infra notes 89-139 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 94-115 and accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 136-37 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding no obvious
and exclusive ownership because the bag was not marked and was discovered in a room contain-
ing a wide variety of personal items).
6. See infra notes 116-39 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., United States v. Waller, 426 F.3d 838, 846 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding sufficient ambi-
guity to suppress the evidence when police knew that the defendant had stored some personal
items in the consenting party's apartment).
8. See, e.g., Snype, 441 F.3d at 136 (applying the obviousness standard); United States v. Mel-
gar, 227 F.3d 1038. 1041-42 (7th Cir. 2000) (same).
9. Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1042 (refusing to impose such a burden upon police).
10. See infra notes 13-139 and accompanying text.
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standard employed in the Second and Seventh Circuits." Finally, Part
IV provides courts with workable rules that identify and define the
attributes of obviousness and examines the obviousness standard's im-
pact upon society's interest in quick and efficient searches. 12
II. BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution contains two re-
strictions on government searches: they must be reasonable and sup-
ported by a warrant.13 However, not all governmental searches are
subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.14 The Supreme Court origi-
nally interpreted the Amendment strictly, extending its protections
only to physical intrusions upon traditionally protected areas.15 How-
ever, in Katz v. United States, the Court expanded the Fourth Amend-
ment's protection to areas in which the target of the search can claim a
reasonable expectation of privacy. 16 The Supreme Court adopted a
two-part test to address this supplemental inquiry.17 First, an individ-
ual must demonstrate "an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy";
second, the individual's "expectation [must] be one that society is pre-
11. See infra notes 140-212 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 213-42 and accompanying text.
13. U.S. CONST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."). One influen-
tial commentator has suggested that the reasonableness requirement may be the more significant
of the two clauses. See generally Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment,
98 MICH. L. REV. 547 (1999) (noting that the Framers focused their attention on the unreasona-
bleness of eighteenth-century "general warrants" rather than warrantless arrests and searches,
which draw contemporary Fourth Amendment scrutiny).
14. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) ("[T]he Fourth Amendment protects
people, not places. What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.").
15. The Court's jurisprudence originally relied upon common law notions of trespass. United
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012): see also Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466
(1928) ("Neither the cases we have cited nor any of the many federal decisions brought to our
attention hold the Fourth Amendment to have been violated as against a defendant unless there
has been an official search and seizure of his person, or such a seizure of his papers or his
tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of his house 'or curtilage' for the purpose
of making a seizure.").
16. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Although the majority opinion did not
mandate this approach, it is now well-established law. Allison M. Lucier, Comment, You Can
Judge a Container by Its Cover: The Single-Purpose Container Exception and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1809, 1811 n.7 (2009); see also United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 8
(1977) ("[lIt would be a mistake to conclude. . . that the Warrant Clause was therefore intended
to guard only against intrusions into the home.").
17. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Lucier, supra note 16, at 1811 &
n.7 (citing California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39 (1988)).
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pared to recognize as 'reasonable."' "8 In Katz, for example, the Court
understood a person's entering a public telephone booth and closing
the door behind him to be a sufficiently reasonable manifestation of
privacy to implicate the Fourth Amendment. 19
After determining that the government intruded upon an area that
is constitutionally protected or that reserves a reasonable expectation
of privacy, the Fourth Amendment requires a search of that area to be
reasonable and supported by a warrant. 20 Although the Supreme
Court has "firmly established" that warrantless searches are presump-
tively unreasonable, 21 the police may circumvent the warrant require-
ment by obtaining an individual's voluntary consent to search his
belongings. 22 Upon obtaining consent, the reasonableness of a search
becomes a balance of the consenting individual's privacy interests and
the interests of the government. 23 As the individual's privacy expecta-
tions increase, the government's actions must serve an even greater
public interest in order to justify an intrusion.24
Thus, the search of a closed container based upon the apparent au-
thority of a third party's consent is "situated at the intersection of two
distinct [aspects] of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." 2 5 The first
aspect involves the nature and source of that consent and whose pri-
18. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). The Supreme Court recently made clear
that "the Katz reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test has been added to, not substituted for, the
common-law trespassory test." Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952.
19. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 (majority opinion) ("One who occupies [a telephone booth], shuts
the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to
assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world.").
20. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
21. E.g., Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 559 (2004); see also Katz, 389 U.S. at 357 ("[S]earches
conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment .... ").
22. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973). For an interesting analysis of
how federal district courts regularly assess voluntariness, see Brian A. Sutherland, Note,
Whether Consent to Search Was Given Voluntarily: A Statistical Analysis of Factors that Predict
the Suppression Rulings of the Federal District Courts, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2192 (2006). Suther-
land details several factors that are germane to the burden upon law enforcement to obtain valid
consent. See also discussion infra Part III.A.1.
23. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) ("[T]he permissibility of a particular law
enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment
interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.").
24. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561-62 (1976) (noting that, while
the privacy interest in the home is especially high, automobiles are significantly different and
that the minimal intrusion upon a motorist's interests are outweighed by the public's interest in
border enforcement).
25. Noah Stacy, Comment, Apparent Third Party Authority and Computers: Ignorance of the
Lock Is No Excuse, 76 U. CIN. L. REV. 1431, 1433 (2008) (engaging in a similar discussion with
respect to third-party consent to search a computer).
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vacy interests it implicates. 26 This aspect is fraught with the potential
for constitutional missteps: an officer must establish the individual's
authority to consent, 27 be mindful of objections from other residents, 28
and ensure that the individual's consent is voluntarily given. 29 The
second aspect involves the heightened expectations of privacy that
courts generally attribute to closed containers.30 The following sec-
tions address both aspects. The first section discusses the develop-
ment of the apparent authority doctrine under the guise of third-party
consent.31 The second section examines an individual's legitimate ex-
pectations of privacy in closed containers. 32 Finally, the third section
discusses how courts have attempted to reconcile these important as-
pects of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence by developing different
standards to which law enforcement officers must conform their
conduct. 33
A. The Development of the Apparent Authority Doctrine
The Supreme Court has long recognized that a third party's con-
sent-the consent of an individual other than the residence's primary
occupants-can render a warrantless search reasonable if it was freely
given and supported by sufficient authority.34 While a third party's
authority to consent to a search might seem objectively obvious to an
officer when the resident answers the door, various living arrange-
ments and unusual factual circumstances can precipitate unforeseen
constitutional consequences. 35 Therefore, the Supreme Court has de-
veloped the doctrine of apparent authority in order to allow officers to
effectively execute their duties without letting a single good-faith mis-
take unravel their efforts. A review of United States v. Matlock, Illi-
nois v. Rodriguez, and Georgia v. Randolph illustrates the
26. A third party's consent may implicate not only his own privacy interests, but also the
privacy interests of another individual with some connection to the residence. See United States
v. Taylor, 600 F.3d 678, 681 (6th Cir. 2010) (discussing the actual, common, and apparent author-
ity of third parties).
27. See infra notes 36-57 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 58-69 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 157-62 and accompanying text.
30. See, e.g., United States v. Fultz, 146 F.3d 1102, 1105 (9th Cir, 1998) (discussing legitimate
expectations of privacy in containers); United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 1978)
(discussing legitimate expectations of privacy in a locked footlocker).
31. See infra notes 34-73 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 74-88 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 89-139 and accompanying text.
34. See infra notes 36-57 and accompanying text.
35. See, e.g., infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text (describing a situation in which officers
confronted a woman who-though not a resident-opened the door to an apartment, possessed
keys to the apartment, and referred to the apartment as her own).
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underpinnings, application, and limitations of the apparent authority
doctrine.
1. United States v. Matlock
The concept of third-party consent stems from joint authority over
property.36 For instance, if two people have access to a bag, each as-
sumes the risk that the other will permit someone else to look inside
it.3 7 Thus, in Matlock, the Court determined that an individual who is
not the target of a search could nevertheless consent to that search so
long as he "possessed common authority over or other sufficient rela-
tionship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected."38
In Matlock, the defendant's girlfriend shared a bedroom with the
defendant, slept there regularly (including the night before the
search), and used a dresser in the room.39 The Court concluded that
these facts were sufficient to establish common authority over the
premises, 40 noting that two or more individuals with "joint access or
control" over property should reasonably recognize that they have
"assumed the risk" of the other consenting to a search of that prop-
erty.41 However, the Court reserved judgment-as it historically
had-on the issue of apparent authority; namely, whether the Court
would uphold the search on the sole basis of the officer's reasonable
belief that the girlfriend had sufficient authority over the premises to
consent to a search.42
2. Illinois v. Rodriguez
Despite its initial reticence, the Supreme Court ultimately adopted
the doctrine of apparent authority in Rodriguez and permitted the po-
lice to rely upon a third party's consent to search a residence when
they reasonably, although mistakenly, believed that the third party
had the authority to give it.43 The Court noted that, while the burden
of establishing such authority rests upon law enforcement,44 "further
inquiry" as to authority is only required when a reasonable person
36. See, e.g., Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969) ("Since [the third party] was a joint user
of the bag, he clearly had authority to consent to its search.").
37. Id. at 740.
38. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974).
39. Id. at 175-76.
40. See id. at 177.
41. Id. at 171 n.7.
42. See id. at 177 n.14; see also Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 488 (1964) (expressly re-
jecting the apparent authority doctrine).
43. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990).
44. Id. at 181.
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would doubt the truth of an individual's explicit assertion that she
lives in the area to be searched. 45
In Rodriguez, the police arrested the defendant in his apartment
after a woman, who had lived there for several months, consented "to
unlock[ing] the door with her key." 46 The woman referred to the
apartment as "'our' apartment" 47 and indicated that she kept some of
her belongings there.48 The defendant moved to suppress all evidence
seized during the arrest, claiming that the woman did not possess suf-
ficient authority to consent to the entry.49 The trial court agreed, con-
sidering that she was an "infrequent visitor" who could not invite
guests to the apartment, that she had moved out some of her posses-
sions, and that her name did not appear on the lease.50
While the Supreme Court agreed that the woman obviously lacked
common authority,51 it upheld the search under the doctrine of appar-
ent authority. 52 In doing so, the Court rejected the defendant's con-
tention that government officers must be factually correct in their
judgment, 53 instead requiring only that their assessment be reasonable
under the circumstances. 54 The Court noted that, "[b]ecause many sit-
uations which confront officers in the course of executing their duties
are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes
on their part."55 In adopting and applying an objective reasonable-
ness standard to the determination of apparent authority to consent,
the Court advised that "sufficient probability, not certainty, is the
touchstone of reasonableness" 56 and that "law enforcement officials
must be expected to apply their judgment" under the circumstances.57
45. Id. at 188.
46. Id. at 179.
47. Id. In fact, she had moved out a month earlier, but failed to disclose that fact to the
police. Id. at 181.
48. Id. at 179.
49. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 180.
50. Id. However, she testified at the preliminary hearing that the defendant had given her the
key. Id. at 181.
51. Id. at 182 ("[T]he Appellate Court's determination of no common authority over the
apartment was obviously correct.").
52. Id. at 186.
53. Id. at 184.
54. Id. at 188 ("As with other factual determinations bearing upon search and seizure, deter-
mination of consent to enter must be judged against an objective standard: would the facts avail-
able to the officer at the moment . . . warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the
consenting party had authority over the premises?" (alteration in original) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
55. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
56. Id. at 185 (quoting Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971)).
57. Id. at 186.
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3. Georgia v. Randolph
The Supreme Court's holding in Randolph effectively limited an of-
ficer's ability to rely on a third party's authority to consent by giving
overriding weight to a present resident's express refusal.58 In Ran-
dolph, the police accompanied a woman to her and her husband's
house, where she volunteered that there were "items of drug evi-
dence" inside.59 After her husband refused to permit the police to
search the premises, they turned to his wife, who eagerly offered her
consent.60 Despite the husband's objection, the police entered his
house, observed contraband, and subsequently arrested him.61
In determining whether the wife's consent could vitiate the hus-
band's objection, the Court's central inquiry was "whether customary
social understanding accords the consenting tenant authority powerful
enough to prevail over the co-tenant's objection." 62 It asserted that
"widely shared social expectations" are a "constant element" of
Fourth Amendment reasonableness and that the facts must be ana-
lyzed in accordance with the prevailing social practice. 63 For instance,
while a guest need not inquire about some "exceptional arrangement"
between common tenants,64 no reasonable person would construe one
resident's invitation to enter as sufficient against the other's express
refusal.65 The Court extended this reasoning to law enforcement de-
spite the government's countervailing interests.66
The Court drew a "fine line" between a present, objecting co-tenant
and one who may be asleep in the next room. 67 In justifying this dis-
tinction, the Court displayed its distaste for requiring law enforcement
to take additional "affirmative steps to confirm the actual authority of
a consenting individual whose authority was apparent." 68 The Court
noted that "it would needlessly limit the capacity of the police to re-
spond to ostensibly legitimate opportunities in the field if [the Court]
58. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 120 (2006).
59. Id. at 107.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 121.
63. Id. at 111.
64. Randolph, 547 U.S. at 111-12 ("[A]Ithough some group living together might make an
exceptional arrangement that no one could admit a guest without the agreement of all, the
chance of such an eccentric scheme is too remote to expect visitors to investigate a particular
household's rules before accepting an invitation to come in.").
65. Id. at 113.
66. Id. at 115.
67. Id. at 121 (referring to the defendant in Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990), who was
asleep when his girlfriend consented to a search of his apartment).
68. Id. at 122.
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were to hold that reasonableness required the police to take affirma-
tive steps to find a potentially objecting co-tenant before acting on the
permission they had already received." 69
In summary, the Supreme Court has long recognized the reasona-
bleness of a warrantless search when it is conducted with the volun-
tary consent of the search's target.70 Additionally, a third party may
consent when he "possesse[s] common authority over or other suffi-
cient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected."71
Although the police can rely upon the apparent authority of a con-
senting individual, as determined by a reasonable, objective stan-
dard, 72 that reliance is limited in the presence of a nonconsenting
resident who expressly refuses them entry.73
B. Legitimate Expectations of Privacy in Containers
While the Supreme Court has always extended rigorous Fourth
Amendment protection to "the sacred threshold of the home," 74 fed-
eral circuit courts have afforded a seemingly higher degree of pro-
tection to certain kinds of containers within the home.75 In United
States v. Block, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ex-
plained that individuals commonly associate certain containers with
their most intimate expectations of privacy:
Common experience of life, clearly a factor in assessing the exis-
tence and the reasonableness of privacy expectations, surely teaches
all of us that the law's "enclosed spaces"-mankind's valises, suit-
cases, footlockers, strong boxes, etc.-are frequently the objects of
his highest privacy expectations, and that the expectations may well
be at their most intense when such effects are deposited temporarily
or kept semi-permanently in public places or in places under the
general control of another.7 6
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973).
71. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974).
72. See Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188.
73. See Randolph, 547 U.S. at 120.
74. Baith v. State, 598 A.2d 762, 764 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 296-97 (1984) ("We frequently have noted
that privacy interests are especially strong in a private residence."); Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 585-86 (1980) ("[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording
of the Fourth Amendment is directed." (quoting United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S.
297, 313 (1972))).
75. See, e.g., United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 541 (4th Cir. 1978) ("While authority to
consent to search of a general area must obviously extend to most objects in plain view within
the area, it cannot be thought automatically to extend to the interiors of every discrete enclosed




Thus, when one consents to the search of his home, that consent does
not necessarily extend to every container found within it. Containers
that are commonly understood to hold personal effects will be subject
to heightened privacy interests that may give pause to a consensual
search.77
Block is the seminal decision addressing an individual's expecta-
tions of privacy in secured containers. There, a woman permitted the
police to enter her home in order to search for the subject of a war-
rant.78 The police subsequently observed contraband and a locked
footlocker in her son's bedroom and, after allegedly obtaining her
consent to search the footlocker, decided to forcefully open it.79 The
Fourth Circuit ultimately held that, while the mother could consent to
a search of her son's room, her authority did not extend to "every
discrete enclosed space capable of search within the area."80 How-
ever, while "each such enclosed space stands on its own bottom for
this purpose,"81 not every closed container achieves a heightened ex-
pectation of privacy. 82 "[P]ockets in clothes, unsecured shoeboxes,
and the like" do not qualify for heightened protection after the police
have received a person's open-ended consent to search the area in
which those objects are located.83 Therefore, in assessing the privacy
expectations of certain containers, the nature of the container-or the
way in which it is secured-is generally considered a dispositive
factor.
The Fourth Circuit's conclusion accords with the Supreme Court's
decision in Katz, which requires a manifested expectation of privacy
by the defendant and society's reasonable recognition of that expecta-
tion.84 The decisive inquiries in Block were whether the container was
secured and whether it was commonly used for preserving the privacy
77. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977) ("Unlike an automobile, whose pri-
.mary function is transportation, luggage is intended as a repository of personal effects. In sum, a
person's expectations of privacy in personal luggage are substantially greater than in an
automobile.").
78. Block, 590 F.2d at 537.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 541. The Fourth Circuit further supported its reasoning by citing to other circuits
that have reached a similar result with respect to a suitcase, a cabinet, an overnight bag, and a
desk. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 541 n.8.
83. Block, 590 F.2d at 541 n.8.
84. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see also California
v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 39-40 (1988) ("An expectation of privacy does not give rise to




of its owner.85 The court determined that, by locking the footlocker,
the son had manifested an expectation of privacy within a space to
which the "[c]ommon experience of life" lends the highest Fourth
Amendment protection.86
The Supreme Court has largely agreed with the Fourth Circuit's as-
sessment in the context of automobiles. The Court has bestowed an
expectation of privacy to certain containers within vehicles when their
owner sufficiently manifested that expectation.87 The Court has also
concluded that when an individual consents to a search of her vehicle,
it is "objectively reasonable for the police to conclude that the general
consent . .. include[s] consent to search containers within that car."88
While the law in the automobile context is well settled, circuit courts
have struggled to analogize these principles to the context of a home.
Accordingly, the circuits have developed two standards that attempt
to reconcile an individual's open-ended consent with the heightened
expectations of privacy associated with certain containers inside a
residence.
C. The Circuit Split Between the Obviousness
and Ambiguity Standards
In Illinois v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court mandated an objective
standard to assess an individual's apparent authority to consent to a
search of a residence. 89 However, this standard has caused "apprecia-
ble entropy among the circuits."90 After acquiring consent to search a
residence from an individual with apparent authority, it is unclear
whether police may construe that consent as extending to closed con-
tainers of ambiguous ownership.91 While some courts, such as the
Second and Seventh Circuits, have looked to whether or not a
container obviously did not belong to the consenting party,92 the Sixth
Circuit has required further inquiry on the part of law enforcement
when presented with any amount of ambiguity as to the container's
85. Block, 590 F.2d at 541 n.8.
86. See id. at 541.
87. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977) (concluding that a repository of
personal effects commands a higher expectation of privacy than an automobile).
88. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (extending the driver's consent to paper bags
lying on the vehicle's floor).
89. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990).
90. United States v. Taylor, 600 F.3d 678, 686 (6th Cir. 2010) (Kethledge, J., dissenting).
91. Compare Taylor, 600 F.3d at 685 (requiring officers to resolve ambiguity before proceed-
ing with a search), with United States v. Zapata-Tamallo, 833 F.2d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1987) (requir-
ing the defendant to prove that the container was obviously his).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 136 (2d Cir. 2006); United States v. Melgar,
227 F.3d 1038, 1041-42 (7th Cir. 2000).
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ownership.93 As a result, the circuits reach different conclusions
under similar circumstances.
1. The Obviousness Standard
The Second and Seventh Circuits, by adopting the obviousness stan-
dard, have extended a resident's open-ended consent to closed con-
tainers, with the exception of those that obviously do not belong to
that resident.94 In the absence of an officer's positive knowledge that
a container belongs to another 95 or some clear manifestation of pri-
vacy,96 the resident's initial blanket consent is not limited by some
menial measure of ambiguity.
a. The Second Circuit's Approach: United States v. Snype
In Snype, the police executed a warrant for the defendant's arrest at
his girlfriend's apartment. 97 After removing the defendant, the police
obtained the girlfriend's consent to search her residence, during which
they found a knapsack, a red plastic bag, and an open box containing
cash. 98 The police subsequently opened the knapsack and bag and
discovered incriminating evidence. 99 After concluding that the girl-
friend voluntarily consented to the search,100 the court addressed
whether her consent to search the apartment extended to the closed
containers within it.10o
The Second Circuit first noted that "her open-ended consent would
permit the search and seizure of any items found in the apartment
with the exception of those 'obviously' belonging to another per-
son." 102 In its analysis, the court relied upon United States v. Zapata-
Tamallo.103 There, a host was held to have the apparent authority to
consent to a search of his guest's duffel bag, despite the fact that an
officer had seen the guest carry the same bag into the apartment, be-
cause that fact alone "was insufficient to prove that the bag obviously
93. See, e.g., Taylor, 600 F.3d at 685; United States v. Purcell, 526 F.3d 953, 964 (6th Cir. 2008).
94. See, e.g., Snype, 441 F.3d at 136; Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041-42.
95. See United States v. Smairat, 503 F. Supp. 2d 973, 991 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (concluding that it
was unreasonable for the officers to proceed with a search without further inquiry because they
did not reasonably believe the consenting party had the apparent authority to consent).
96. United States v. Yang, 478 F.3d 832, 835 (7th Cir. 2007).
97. Snype, 441 F.3d at 126.
98. Id. at 127.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 131.
101. Id. at 136.
102. Id. (citing United States v. Zapata-Tamallo, 833 F.2d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1987)).
103. Snype, 441 F.3d at 136.
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and exclusively belonged to [the guest]."1 0 4 Thus, the defendant in
Snype could not merely assert that there was no objectively reasona-
ble basis for searching the containers; he bore the burden of present-
ing evidence that established they "were obviously and exclusively
his."105 Because the containers were not marked and the room in
which they were found housed objects "ranging from children's toys
to a laptop computer found inside a carrying case,"10 6 the court con-
cluded that the defendant failed to demonstrate that the containers
were obviously and exclusively his, or that the police could not rea-
sonably rely upon the girlfriend's open-ended consent in searching
them.07
b. The Seventh Circuit's Approach: United States v. Melgar
In Melgar, the police arrived at a hotel room looking for counterfeit
checks and asked several women in the room for permission to search
their purses.108 An officer then asked the woman who rented the
room for her permission to search it; the officer did not specifically
ask for permission to search closed containers found inside the room
or inquire as to whether there were additional occupants.109 The po-
lice looked under a mattress and discovered an unmarked floral purse
that contained a counterfeit check and an identification form that in-
dicated the defendant-not the consenting woman-was the purse's
owner.110
After determining that the consenting woman had the apparent au-
thority to consent to the search of the hotel room,"' the Seventh Cir-
cuit turned its attention to the question of her apparent authority over
the purse:
In a sense, the real question for closed container searches is which
way the risk of uncertainty should run. Is such a search permissible
only if the police have positive knowledge that the closed container
is also under the authority of the person who originally consented to
the search . . , or is it permissible if the police do not have reliable
information that the container is not under the authorizer's
control.112
104. Id. (describing Zapata-Tamallo, 833 F.2d at 27).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 137. But see United States v. Taylor, 600 F.3d 678, 685 (6th Cir. 2010) (reaching the
opposite conclusion under similar factual circumstances).
108. United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1039 (7th Cir. 2000).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 1040.




In concluding that the woman's consent extended to the purse, the
court reasoned that the police knew that the consenting woman had
rented the room, the target of their search-counterfeit checks-
could easily fit in a purse, and the discovered purse was unmarked.113
Ultimately, the court found that "the police had no reason to know
that the floral purse they found under the mattress did not belong to
[the consenting party]."114 Additionally, the court contended that "[a]
contrary rule would impose an impossible burden on the police" be-
cause they would not search any closed containers without first deter-
mining the ownership of each one.115
Thus, the Second and Seventh Circuits have created a rule that per-
mits the police to search closed containers after obtaining consent to
search a residence so long as the containers do not obviously belong
to another individual. In the face of ambiguous ownership, an officer
may proceed unless it is objectively unreasonable to assume that the
individual's consent would extend to a particular container.
2. The Ambiguity Standard
The Sixth Circuit, by adopting the ambiguity standard, requires an
officer to cure any uncertainty regarding the ownership of a closed
container before searching it.116 While courts employing the obvi-
ousness standard proscribe a closed-container search only when an of-
ficer has positive knowledge that a container belongs to another,'17
courts employing the ambiguity standard use positive knowledge in
another way; namely, when the circumstances present any measure of
ambiguity, the police must obtain positive knowledge that a question-
able container belongs to the consenting individual. 1 ,
a. United States v. Purcell
In Purcell, after the police arrested the defendant, his girlfriend
consented to a search of their hotel room.119 The police observed two
duffel bags and a backpack in the room, and the girlfriend stated that
113. Id. at 1041-42.
114. Melgar, 227 F.3d at 1041.
115. Id. at 1042.
116. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 600 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Purcell,
526 F.3d 953 (6th Cir. 2008).
117. An officer may obtain such positive knowledge from the consenting party's express abdi-
cation of authority or the overwhelming evidence of the circumstances. See discussion infra Part
IVA.
118. See, e.g., United States v. Waller, 426 F.3d 838, 846 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding enough ambi-
guity when the police knew the defendant had stored some personal items in the consenting
party's apartment).
119. Purcell, 526 F.3d at 957.
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one contained a firearm.120 She also indicated that one of the duffel
bags was hers, and upon searching it, an officer found marijuana and
men's clothing. 121 During his search, the officer "realized that [the
girlfriend] had misstated her ownership of the bag, [but] he did not
ask her to verify whether she owned any of the other bags in the
room" before continuing to search them.122
The Sixth Circuit acknowledged that the girlfriend had the apparent
authority to search the room, but noted that "apparent authority can-
not exist if there is ambiguity as to the asserted authority and the
searching officers do not take steps to resolve the ambiguity." 12 3
Once the officer discovered men's clothing in the bag claimed by the
girlfriend, "ambiguity clouded [her] authority to consent to the search
of the backpack."1 24 As such, the police were obligated to obtain ad-
ditional consent to search the other items in the room.12 5
The government and dissent argued that the defendant and his girl-
friend were in an intimate relationship, contributing to a "good-faith
basis for initially believing a would-be consenter's assertion of author-
ity," as many couples pack together.126 However, while the majority
conceded that couples may share luggage, it found the potential travel
habits of some to be unconvincing.127
b. United States v. Taylor
In Taylor, the police arrived at the defendant's girlfriend's apart-
ment and arrested the defendant.12 8 The officers then obtained the
girlfriend's consent to search the apartment, suspecting that the defen-
dant may have possessed a firearm; they did not ask her or the defen-
dant for permission to search the defendant's belongings.12 9 The
police entered a spare bedroom and noticed a closet "strewn with
men's clothes, children's clothes, and toys."o30 They then found a
120. Id. at 957-58.
121. Id. at 958.
122. Id. The police eventually discovered a firearm in the backpack, but the facts later re-
vealed that the defendant was the sole owner of the first bag searched, as well as the backpack.
Id.
123. Id. at 963.
124. Id. at 964.
125. Purcell, 526 F.3d at 964.
126. Id. at 964-65; id. at 966 (Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[I]t would
seem reasonable for officers to infer that a couple sharing a bed would share access to un-
marked, unlocked and androgynous-looking luggage.").
127. Id. at 965 n.5 (majority opinion).





men's size ten-and-a-half shoebox on the closet's floor, opened it, and
discovered a firearm. 131
The Sixth Circuit first noted the circumstantial ambiguity: the closet
contained a mix of men's, women's, and children's clothes, and "noth-
ing in the closet indicated that the items within it belonged to [the
defendant's girlfriend] or were regularly used by her." 132 The court
determined that a reasonable person would have doubts about the
ownership of the shoebox and added that "the police would likely not
have opened the closed shoebox if they believed it belonged to [the
girlfriend]. Rather, they opened the shoebox precisely because they
believed it likely belonged to [the defendant]." 13 3 While acknowledg-
ing that shoeboxes are not subject to a high degree of privacy,134 espe-
cially when unsealed,135 the court nevertheless found the police's
failure to cure the factual ambiguity to be fatal to the girlfriend's ap-
parent authority to consent to the search and granted the defendant's
motion to suppress the firearm. 136
In reaching its decision, the court relied upon United States v. Wal-
ler, another Sixth Circuit decision that rejected a resident's apparent
authority to consent to the search of an unmarked suitcase even
though the suitcase was found in the consenting resident's closet.137
The Waller court determined that, because the police knew that the
defendant was storing items in another's apartment, enough ambiguity
existed to warrant further inquiry.138
In summary, the circuit courts have developed two standards to as-
sess officers' conduct when they encounter closed containers of am-
biguous ownership during a consensual search. While the Second and
Seventh Circuits permit the search of any closed containers that do
not obviously belong to someone other than the consenting individual,
the Sixth Circuit requires officers to cure any measure of ambiguity
they encounter during their search. These standards attempt to recon-
cile the heightened expectations of privacy afforded to closed contain-
131. Id. at 679-80.
132. Id. at 682.
133. Id.; accord United States v. Waller, 426 F.3d 838, 849 (6th Cir. 2005) ("Why would the
police open the suitcase if they reasonably believed it belonged to [the consenting party, as
opposed to the defendant]?").
134. Taylor, 600 F.3d at 683.
135. Id. at 684; accord United States v. Cork, No. 00-5099, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 20443, at
*19-20 (6th Cir. Sept. 6, 2001) (finding no expectations of privacy in an unsealed, unmarked
shoebox).
136. Taylor, 600 F.3d at 685.
137. Waller, 426 F.3d at 847.
138. Taylor, 600 F.3d at 682 (citing Waller, 426 F.3d at 847-49).
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ers with law enforcement's need to conduct an efficient, thorough
search of a residence after obtaining freely given consent to do so.139
III. ANALYSIS: CIRCUIT COURTS SHOULD APPLY THE
OBVIOUSNESS STANDARD
Courts should apply the obviousness standard because it more
strictly accords with the Supreme Court's mandate of objectivity. In
Illinois v. Rodriguez, the Court found "sufficient probability, not cer-
tainty, [to be] the touchstone of reasonableness." 140 While some am-
biguity may exist as to the ownership of a particular container,141
officers should only be required to terminate their search if it would
be unreasonable to continue due to obvious problems of authority. 142
This Part advocates for the obviousness standard in the context of the
ambiguity standard's shortcomings. The first section asserts that the
ambiguity standard improperly allocates the burden of defining the
scope of consent to law enforcement.143 The second section argues
that the ambiguity standard misinterprets Rodriguez, which permits
an officer to execute a consensual search until it is objectively unrea-
sonable to continue. 144
A. The Ambiguity Standard Unreasonably Shifts the Burden of
Defining the Scope of Consent
The Supreme Court has emphasized the significant role that con-
sent plays in efficiently obtaining reliable evidence.145 However,
139. Though these situations may also implicate notions of common law trespass, see supra
notes 15-18, open-ended consent from an individual with apparent authority shifts the discussion
away from whether an intrusion occurred and toward whether the officer was reasonable in
extending that consent to a particular closed container. This Comment will refer only to the
expectations of privacy associated with closed containers when discussing a potential violation of
an individual's Fourth Amendment rights.
140. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 185 (1990) (quoting Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797,
803-04 (1971)).
141. Id. at 186 ("[Mlany situations which confront officers in the course of executing their
duties are more or less ambiguous . . . ." (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176
(1949))).
142. See United States v. Purcell, 526 F.3d 953, 967 (6th Cir. 2008) (Sutton, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("The question after all is not whether the officers were certain that
[the consenting party] exercised joint access or control for most purposes .. .; it is whether there
was enough uncertainty to undermine the officers' reasonable . . . belief that [she] had authority
to consent." (third and fourth alterations in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
143. See infra notes 145-89 and accompanying text.
144. See infra notes 190-212 and accompanying text.
145. See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) ("In situations where the
police have some evidence of illicit activity, but lack probable cause to arrest or search, a search
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while courts have traditionally afforded wide latitude to police officers
after they obtain an individual's "unrestricted consent,"1 46 that con-
sent does not allow police officers to break into safes or tear through
furniture in search of contraband.147  Thus, after obtaining open-
ended consent, the crucial inquiry for law enforcement is one of
scope:148 Can an officer construe an individual's consent as automati-
cally extending to closed continers on the premises, or must the officer
renew and redefine the original consent with respect to each
container? 149
The answer lies in how courts have traditionally allocated the re-
sponsibilities of both law enforcement and private citizens during their
interactions.15 0 "At one end of the spectrum" is the need for efficient,
effective law enforcement, while "[a]t the other end of the spectrum is
the set of values reflecting society's deeply felt belief that the criminal
law cannot be used as an instrument of unfairness."1 51 Because "[t]he
Fourth Amendment was designed to protect people against unre-
strained searches and seizures,"1 52 the police must meet a high burden
when obtaining an individual's consent.' 53 Conversely, that individual
must satisfy a notably smaller burden by either limiting that consent
authorized by a valid consent may be the only means of obtaining important and reliable
evidence.").
146. See, e.g., United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 137 (2d Cir. 2006) (refusing to find that
officers could not reasonably rely on the consenting party's unrestricted consent to search all
items on the premises because the defendant failed to demonstrate that any items obviously
belonged to him); United States v. Lewis, 386 F.3d 475, 481 (2d Cir. 2004) (requiring no warrant
or probable cause upon receipt of voluntary, effective consent).
147. See Peter Goldberger, Consent, Expectations of Privacy, and the Meaning of "Searches"
in the Fourth Amendment, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 319, 345 (1984) (citing 2 WAYNE R.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 8.1(c), at 625
(1978)).
148. See generally Goldberger, supra note 147 (discussing issues related to the scope of war-
rantless searches).
149. In United States v. Melgar, Judge Wood discussed the consequences of such a rule, noting
that "[i]t would mean that [officers] could never search closed containers within a dwelling (in-
cluding hotel rooms) without asking the person whose consent is being given ex ante about every
item they might encounter." 227 F.3d 1038, 1042 (7th Cir. 2000).
150. Compare United States v. Welch, 4 F.3d 761, 763 (9th Cir. 1993) (listing some factors that
demonstrate voluntariness), and United States v. Groves (Groves 1!), 530 F.3d 506, 509-10 (7th
Cir. 2008) (listing some factors that demonstrate authority), with United States v. Anthony, No.
3:10-CR-013-K, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112736, at *11 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 21. 2010) (noting that the
consenting party "did not instruct the officers to limit their search to certain areas or items in the
hotel room, nor did she identify any objects that did not belong to her"), and United States v.
Davis, 967 F.2d 84, 88 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that the consenting party "never indicated-until
after the search-what items in the footlocker belonged to him, nor did he limit his consent to
search to those items").
151. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973).
152. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25. 40 (1949) (Black, J., concurring).
153. See infra notes 156-65 and accompanying text.
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or refusing to give it altogether.154 However, the ambiguity standard
attempts to shift an individual's relatively minor burden of appropri-
ately limiting his own open-ended consent by requiring police officers
to continuously question and define that consent. 155 Courts should
not pile the responsibility of limiting the scope of consent on top of an
already significant police burden, but rather continue to require that
consenting individuals do so at the outset of their interactions with law
enforcement. Consenting parties are in the best position to know the
limits of their authority and willingness to cooperate with law enforce-
ment, and the burden of defining the scope of consent should be allo-
cated accordingly.
1. Law Enforcement Has a Significant Constitutional Burden
While courts have acknowledged the heightened importance of con-
sent in effectuating the duties of law enforcement, they have also im-
posed a two-pronged burden on officers seeking to obtain it.156 First,
law enforcement must show by a preponderance of the evidence that
the consent was voluntary.157 Courts generally look to the totality of
the circumstances when evaluating whether consent was freely
given,158 but they have also enumerated a number of factors.159 Fur-
ther, any level of coercion nullifies consent,160 including threatening
language or the mention of adverse consequences. 161 This is espe-
cially true when consent authorizes the search of a home; courts are
much more likely to find coercion when evidence is recovered from a
private -residence, and police must be especially cautious in such a
situation. 162
154. See infra notes 166-89 and accompanying text.
155. See infra notes 156-89 and accompanying text.
156. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Sardone, No. 98-1073, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 205, at *6
(Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 25, 1999) ("When police rely on consent, the [government] must show
'consent unfettered by coercion, express or implied, and also something more than mere acquies-
cence to a claim of lawful authority."' (quoting Commonwealth v. Sanna, 674 N.E.2d 1067, 1072
(Mass. 1997))).
157. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222-26 (1973).
158. E.g., id. at 226.
159. See, e.g., United States v. Welch, 4 F.3d 761, 763 (9th Cir. 1993) ("Some of the factors to
be weighed are (1) whether the person was in custody; (2) whether the officers had their guns
drawn; (3) whether Miranda warnings have been given; (4) whether the person was told that he
had the right not to consent: (5) whether he was told a search warrant could be obtained."). For
a statistical analysis of how district courts assess these and other factors, including consent forms,
language, and custody, see Sutherland, supra note 22.
160. See Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248.
161. See Sutherland, supra note 22, at 2211-12.
162. Id. at 2219.
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Second, law enforcement must demonstrate by a preponderance of
the evidence that the consenting individual had the requisite authority
to consent.' 63 In evaluating this factor, courts look to whether an ob-
jectively reasonable officer would believe that the consenting party
had such authority.164 This is a difficult burden often fraught with un-
usual situations and disingenuous consenting parties; officers repeat-
edly confront consenting individuals with unique interests in the
residence, and for this reason, law enforcement must firmly establish
authority at the outset to avoid working an injustice upon absent
parties.165
Thus, law enforcement's initial burden is difficult to meet, but justi-
fiably so due to the importance of individual privacy. The Supreme
Court requires a balance between the legitimate need for searches and
the equally important requirement of assuring the existence of author-
ity and absence of coercion. Accordingly, once an officer has satisfied
himself with the voluntary nature of an authorized party's open-ended
consent, courts should allow that officer to quickly and efficiently exe-
cute a search of the premises. However, some courts applying the am-
biguity standard impose the additional burden of establishing the
163. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 332 F.3d 1163, 1170 (9th Cir. 2003); People v. Gonzalez,
667 N.E.2d 323, 326 (N.Y. 1996).
164. See, e.g., Gonzalez, 667 N.E.2d at 326.
165. Given the importance of establishing authority at the outset of a consensual search,
courts have labored over the proper indicia of authority. In United States v. Groves, for example,
the Seventh Circuit enumerated several factors that can inform a determination of apparent
authority to consent. These factors include, but are not limited to:
(1) possession of a key to the premises; (2) a person's admission that she lives at the
residence in question; (3) possession of a driver's license listing the residence as the
driver's legal address; (4) receiving mail and bills at that residence; (5) keeping clothing
at the residence; (6) having one's children reside at that address; (7) keeping personal
belongings such as a diary or a pet at that residence; (8) performing household chores
at the home; (9) being on the lease for the premises and/or paying rent; and (10) being
allowed into the home when the owner is not present.
United States v. Groves (Groves II), 530 F.3d 506. 509-10 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States
v. Groves (Groves 1), 470 F.3d 311, 319 (7th Cir. 2006)). However, these considerations may
only apply to an apparent resident, boyfriend, or girlfriend. More difficult situations have arisen
in the context of houseguests, parents, and children. With respect to consenting houseguests, the
Supreme Court has enumerated an additional twelve factors that determine their authority to
consent. See Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 96 n.4 (1990) (listing the factors). With respect to
consenting parents, several commentators have noted the complexities of the circumstances,
which require police to "thoroughly develop an understanding of the relationship." See Jason C.
Miller, When Is a Parent's Authority Apparent? Reconsidering Third-Party Consent Searches of
an Adult Child's Private Bedroom and Property, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2010, at 34. 37. Finally,
with respect to consenting children, circuit courts are split regarding whether such consent is per
se invalid, wholly acceptable, or subject to a totality of the circumstances analysis. See generally
Matt McCaughey, Note, And a Child Shall Lead Them: The Validity of Children's Consent to
Warrantless Searches of the Family Home, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 747 (1996).
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scope of consent with respect to closed containers discovered in the
residence.
2. Consenting Individuals Have a Substantially Lighter Burden
Courts have consistently held that it is the duty of consenting par-
ties, not police officers, to adequately limit and define the scope of
their consent. 166 For example, in United States v. Freeman, a case in
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, an officer approached
the defendant's friend on a train platform and asked whether some
bags in a train car were his.167 The friend answered affirmatively and
consented to the officer's search of the car.168 The officer opened a
backpack, which turned out to be the defendant's, and discovered two
large blocks of cocaine.169 The defendant argued that the backpack
was not within the scope of his friend's consent because "consent to
search the room did not authorize the search of a closed backpack
inside the room."170 However, the Fifth Circuit noted that the Su-
preme Court had "specifically rejected the notion that an officer
should be required to request permission before searching each indi-
vidual container."171 The Fifth Circuit concluded that the defendant's
friend knew the contents of the train car and that it was his responsi-
bility to limit the scope of his consent.172 The court further noted that
"[a] reasonable officer could certainly assume that consent to search
the room included consent to search any unlocked bags in the
room."173
The small burden placed on a consenting party with respect to the
scope of their own consent is not only fair, given the substantial bur-
den law enforcement must satisfy before executing a consensual
search,174 but also logical because consent is optional and entirely
within the discretion of the consenting party.175 Additionally, the con-
senting party is in the best position to know those things over which
he may claim authority and those things that he may wish to remain
166. See, e.g., Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 252 (1991); United States v. Davis, 967 F.2d 84,
88 (2d Cir. 1992).
167. United States v. Freeman, 482 F.3d 829, 830-31 (5th Cir. 2007).
168. Id. at 831.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 833.
171. Id. (citing Jimeno, 500 U.S. at 252 (involving a similar situation during an automobile
stop)).
172. Id.
173. Freeman, 482 F.3d at 834.
174. See supra notes 156-65 and accompanying text.
175. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973) (noting that consent "could be
freely and effectively withheld").
2011] 223
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
private. 176 Requiring law enforcement to establish both authority and
specific privacy interests would result in an endless guessing game at
the expense of both parties. Nevertheless, the ambiguity standard
seeks to shift this burden from knowledgeable consenting parties to
already-burdened police officers. When an officer encounters any
measure of ambiguity as to the ownership of a certain container-
whether it be a shoebox,177 duffel bag, 178 or luggagel 79-Courts apply-
ing the ambiguity standard require the officer to discontinue his con-
sensual search and specifically inquire about the container. 180 These
courts simply ignore the notable absence of any expressed limitations
to the search, as well as the objectively reasonable conclusion that the
container belongs to the consenting party.' 8' This unreasonable shift
in scope disregards the Supreme Court's clear aversion to requiring
police to request permission to search every container they encoun-
ter.182 As the Court emphasized in Randolph, "[I]t would needlessly
limit the capacity of the police to respond to ostensibly legitimate op-
portunities in the field if [the Court] were to hold that reasonableness
required the police to take affirmative steps to find a potentially ob-
jecting co-tenant before acting on the permission they had already re-
ceived."' 83 Nevertheless, courts employing the ambiguity standard
require law enforcement to take affirmative steps in seeking out a res-
ident's refusal before acting on her freely given, open-ended permis-
sion. Law enforcement must therefore second-guess freely given
consent with ill-informed judgment as to what the consenting party
may or may not have wished to keep private.
Most importantly, the responsibility of limiting the scope of consent
should stay with consenting parties because it accords with the
176. See Freeman, 482 F.3d at 833.
177. United States v. Taylor, 600 F.3d 678, 685 (6th Cir. 2010) ("[T]he officers could easily
have gone downstairs and asked [the consenting party] to clarify her authority over the
shoebox." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
178. United States v. Purcell, 526 F.3d 953, 964 (6th Cir. 2008) ("[T]he agents never asked [the
consenting party] to clarify her authority over any of the other bags in the room.").
179. United States v. Waller, 426 F.3d 838, 849 (6th Cir. 2005) ("It would not have been bur-
densome for the officers to have asked [the consenting party] whether the luggage belonged to
him . . . prior to opening the bag.").
180. See, e.g., Taylor, 600 F.3d at 685; Purcell, 526 F.3d at 964; Waller, 426 F.3d at 849.
181. See, e.g., Purcell, 526 F.3d at 967 (Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(noting that the consenting party's confusion as to which bag was hers "would buttress a reason-
able belief that no clear boundaries existed between the possessions of the pair").
182. See Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 252 (1991) ("[Defendants] argue ... that if the police
wish to search closed containers within a car they must separately request permission to search
each container. But we see no basis for adding this sort of superstructure to the Fourth Amend-
ment's basic test of objective reasonableness.").
183. Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 122 (2006).
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"shared social expectations" expounded in Georgia v. Randolph.184
There, the Supreme Court declared that police officers need not in-
quire about "exceptional arrangement[s]" or "eccentric scheme[s],"
such as co-tenants agreeing "that no one could admit a guest without
the agreement of all," because such arrangements contradict custom-
ary social understanding.18 5 Just as a welcomed guest may enter a res-
idence without seeking potential nonconsenting co-tenants, so too a
police officer may perform a consensual search of a residence without
seeking the same.
When a police officer engages in a search with the unlimited con-
sent of the resident, customary social understanding would typically
afford that officer with the reasonable belief that the resident's open-
ended consent extends to closed containers and would certainly not
require the officer to seek out a revocation of that consent.186 Just
because certain facts create some modicum of ambiguity as to owner-
ship, such as the presence of men's clothing in the consenting woman's
duffle bag in Purcell,187 courts should not immediately shift the bur-
den of limiting the scope of consent to police officers and thereby hin-
der them in the performance of their duties pursuant to a shared
social understanding. As the dissent in Purcell noted, the men's cloth-
ing merely indicated that the couple shared luggage; if the consenting
woman was confused as to which bag held her belongings, "that con-
fusion would buttress a reasonable belief that no clear boundaries ex-
isted between the possessions of the pair, which is hardly an
improbable scenario when it comes to a traveling couple." 18 Custom-
ary social understanding would not suggest that the woman did not
own the bag, but merely exercised joint access over it.189
Thus, courts unreasonably shift the burden of defining the scope of
consent when they require police officers to discontinue a consensual
search and redefine the parameters of consent with respect to each
closed container. The Supreme Court has expressed its discontent
with rules that force officers to request permission to search each
184. Id. at 111.
185. Id. at 111-12.
186. Unless the containers implicitly manifest their owner's nonconsent by means of a lock,
label, or seal. See infra notes 224-225 and accompanying text. But see United States v. Jones,
356 F.3d 529, 534 (4th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he scope of a consent search is not limited only to those
areas or items for which specific verbal permission is granted. Consent may be supplied by non-
verbal conduct as well. Thus, a suspect's failure to object (or withdraw his consent) when an
officer exceeds limits allegedly set by the suspect [by locking the container] is a strong indicator
that the search was within the proper bounds of the consent search." (citation omitted)).
187. United States v. Purcell, 526 F.3d 953, 964 (6th Cir. 2008).
188. Id. at 967 (Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
189. See United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 n.7 (1974).
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container they encounter, and customary social understanding would
rightly not require it.
B. The Ambiguity Standard Misinterprets Rodriguez's
Mandate of Objectivity
In Illinois v. Rodriguez, the Supreme Court issued an objective
standard by which police should determine the validity of an individ-
ual's consent: "[W]ould the facts available to the officer at the mo-
ment . . . warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the
consenting party had authority over the premises?" 190 This standard
has been extended to property within the premises; police must deter-
mine whether an objectively reasonable officer would believe that the
consenting party had authority over any discovered closed contain-
ers. 191 Indeed, many courts simply assume authority over containers
after authority over the premises has been established.192 Courts that
have adopted the ambiguity standard, however, often misinterpret
Rodriguez's objective test and examine the subjective intent of law
enforcement during the search. 193 For example, in United States v.
Waller, a Sixth Circuit case, the defendant stored some luggage in a
friend's closet with the friend's permission. 194 The defendant was
eventually arrested outside the friend's apartment on an outstanding
warrant, and the police asked the friend whether they could search his
home.195 He agreed, noting that the defendant had kept some "prop-
erty" within his apartment, but did not specify the nature of that prop-
erty or where it might be located.196 The police eventually found
some unmarked luggage, opened it, and discovered the defendant's
weapons.197 The Sixth Circuit held that the trial court erred in failing
to suppress the weapons, reasoning that "[t]he very purpose of the
190. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990) (second alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
191. See, e.g., Jones, 356 F.3d at 534 ("[I]t was objectively reasonable for [the officer] to be-
lieve that [the consenting individual's] express consent to search the duffle bag extended to the
locked metal box."); see also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
192. See, e.g., United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 136 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that, because
there was no question that the resident of the apartment had the authority to consent to a
search, "her open-ended consent would permit the search and seizure of any items found in the
apartment with the exception of those 'obviously' belonging to another person").
193. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 600 F.3d 678, 682 (6th Cir. 2010) ("[Tlhe police would
likely not have opened the closed shoebox if they believed it belonged to the [consenting party].
Rather, they opened the shoebox precisely because they believed it likely belonged to [the
defendant].").






police presence was to search for (presumably) illegal possessions of
[the defendant's]. Why would the police open the suitcase if they rea-
sonably believed it belonged to [the consenting friend]?" 198
The Sixth Circuit's visitation into the subjective intentions of police
officers is both improper and patently contradictory to Supreme Court
precedent. The issue is not whether an officer would have opened a
container based on his particular beliefs, but whether a reasonable of-
ficer would have objectively determined that the container belonged
to the defendant.199 That is to say, upon obtaining an individual's
freely given, open-ended consent to search his residence, an officer
may search the premises until it is objectively unreasonable to con-
tinue.200 In applying an objective reasonableness standard to the de-
termination of the authority to and extent of consent, the Court
cautioned that "many situations which confront officers in the course
of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, [and] room must
be allowed for some mistakes on their part."201 Thus, courts must
trust the objective determinations of law enforcement officers. 202
However, the ambiguity standard requires courts to engage in con-
jecture regarding the subjective intent of officers. The fact that the
officers in Waller may have subjectively believed that the suitcase be-
longed to someone other than the consenting party is irrelevant. The
only appropriate inquiry that the court should have made was whether
the officers were reasonable in believing that it belonged to the friend.
Moreover, this improper examination of subjective intent often ig-
nores the nature of the alleged crime that necessitated a search in the
first place. For example, in United States v. Snype, law enforcement
officers "obtained an arrest warrant for [the defendant] on charges of
armed bank robbery." 203 When executing the warrant at an apart-
ment belonging to another, the officers saw a knapsack, a red plastic
198. Id. at 849.
199. See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990).
200. See United States v. Purcell, 526 F.3d 953, 967 (6th Cir. 2008) (Sutton, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("The question after all is not whether the officers were certain that
[the consenting party] exercised joint access or control for most purposes . . ; it is whether there
was enough uncertainty to undermine the officers' reasonable ... belief that [she] had authority
to consent." (third and fourth alterations in original) (citation omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
201. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 186 (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
202. See United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038,1041 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[T]he real question for
closed container searches is which way the risk of uncertainty should run. Is such a search per-
missible only if the police have positive knowledge that the closed container is also under the
authority of the person who originally consented to the search . . . , or is it permissible if the
police do not have reliable information that the container is not under the authorizer's
control.").
203. United States v. Snype, 441 F.3d 119, 126 (2d Cir. 2006).
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bag, and a box taken from the bank during the robbery. 204 After ob-
taining the resident's consent to search the apartment, the officers
found money and weapons inside the containers.205 While a jurisdic-
tion applying the ambiguity standard may have objected to the subjec-
tive intent of the officers-in that the officers may have believed that
the containers belonged to the defendant-the Second Circuit empha-
sized the conspiratorial nature of the crime, which "necessarily raised
the possibility that various persons in the apartment might share pos-
sessory interest in the items searched." 2 0 6
Finally, an examination of subjective intent also ignores the "as-
sumption of risk" approach adopted by the Supreme Court in United
States v. Matlock.2 0 7 In United States v. Davis, the Second Circuit
squarely addressed this issue. 2 0 8 There, the defendant argued that the
consenting party could not authorize the search of certain containers
because law enforcement officers were expressly looking for his prop-
erty in those containers. 209 Despite this contention, the court noted:
One who shares a house or room or auto with another understands
that the partner may invite strangers-that his privacy is not abso-
lute, but contingent in large measure on the decisions of another.
Decisions of either person define the extent of the privacy involved,
a principle that does not depend on whether the stranger welcomed
into the [area] turns out to be an agent or another drug dealer. 210
When an individual leaves his property in the home of another with-
out issuing any instructions as to its care or explicitly marking it as his
property, he assumes the risk that the other person may search or in-
vite another party to search that property. 211 His property is not
shrouded in an extra layer of constitutional protection merely because
204. Id. at 126-27.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 136-37. "To the extent the discovery of these items in the same room where [the
defendant] was arrested suggests a connection between him and the bags, such a possibility
hardly equates to [the defendant's] obvious, much less exclusive, ownership of the bags." Id. at
136. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied heavily upon United States v. Zapata-Tamallo,
which required the defendant "to adduce credible evidence demonstrating that these items were
obviously and exclusively his." Id. (citing United States v. Zapata-Tamallo, 833 F.2d 25, 27 (2d
Cir. 1987)).
207. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974); see also United States v. Davis, 967
F.2d 84, 88 (2d Cir. 1992).
208. See Davis, 967 F.2d at 88.
209. Id.
210. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Chaidez, 919 F.2d 1193, 1202 (7th
Cir. 1990)).
211. Id. ("[The consenting party's] actual possession of the footlocker, and the fact that [the
defendant] never prohibited [that party] from examining [the defendant's] containers therein,
lead us to conclude that [the defendant] assumed the risk that [the consenting party] would
permit others to search the trunk and its contents.").
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it is his. It is subject to the same objective determinations that attach
to the consent of an individual with apparent authority.
Thus, courts that have adopted the ambiguity standard misapply the
mandate of objectivity issued by the Supreme Court in Rodriguez.
Moreover, their misapplication ignores the nature of the suspected of-
fense giving rise to the search. As the Court noted, consensual
searches are always "more or less ambiguous," 212 and courts concern-
ing themselves with ambiguity should look to some greater degree of
obvious doubt before destroying an individual's open-ended consent
and impeding law enforcement in its duties. Because the ambiguity
standard clearly does not accord with the consistent opinions of the
Supreme Court and several other jurisdictions, this Comment will now
turn to the obviousness standard, its practical implementation in the
courts, and the policy reasons for properly defining the outer limits of
obviously manifested privacy.
IV. IMPACT
Adopting the obviousness standard would promote quick and
efficient searches for the benefit of both law enforcement and con-
senting individuals. The obviousness standard provides a bright-line
rule to law enforcement in the execution of its duties and allows
courts to avoid second-guessing officers by providing an objective lens
through which courts may inspect their actions. However, as a practi-
cal matter, courts must firmly define the characteristics of obvious
ownership in order to prevent the same sort of confusion that the am-
biguity standard inherently creates. To that end, the first section of
this Part attempts to define the requisite indicia of obviousness and
contemplates the criteria to which both police and judges should turn
in assessing a container's ownership.213 The second section enumer-
ates the general policy reasons for adopting these criteria and explains
how they benefit the courts, police, and consenting individuals. 214
A. Judicial Implementation of the Obviousness Standard
Once courts adopt the obviousness standard, officers are left with
one crucial inquiry: Which containers obviously lie beyond the scope
of an authorized party's consent? While the answer may seem intui-
tive, courts have struggled with the varying manners in which contain-
212. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
213. See infra notes 215-35 and accompanying text.
214. See infra notes 236-42 and accompanying text.
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ers are closed or sealed.215 This section offers two firm categories that
place certain closed containers outside the scope of the consenting
party's authority regardless of whether that party chose to limit his
open-ended consent. Specifically, law enforcement must forgo the
search of closed containers when those containers are locked, labeled,
or sealed, or when the searching officer obtains positive knowledge-
whether by a consenting party's express abdication of authority or
some overwhelming circumstantial evidence of the same-that the
container belongs to another.216 This section also warns against the
tendency of courts to bestow special protection to certain enumerated
containers. 217 While some containers may connote a higher level of
privacy, courts should be wary of creating a tiered privacy regime that
is confusing to officers and easily warped by the parameters that con-
senting parties might place around their otherwise open-ended
consent.
1. Locks, Labels, and Seals
When police officers encounter a closed container that is locked,
sealed, or labeled with the name of someone other than the con-
senting party, they should discontinue their search with respect to that
container and obtain additional consent to search it. Labels provide
an easy case for obviousness because they patently indicate another's
ownership, and officers cannot reasonably conclude that the con-
senting party's authority extends to that container.218 Locks and seals,
however, should be treated differently because an objectively reasona-
ble police officer may not so easily determine that such a container
obviously does not belong to the consenting party.
In order to properly examine these indicia of obviousness, the terms
"locked" and "sealed" must be adequately defined. While there are
varying degrees of manifested privacy among closed containers, a
closed lid on a cigar box or a zipped backpack should not rise to the
level of, say, taping the lid or padlocking the zipper. For the purposes
215. See infra notes 218-25 and accompanying text.
216. See infra notes 226-34 and accompanying text.
217. See infra note 235 and accompanying text.
218. See United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038. 1042 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that the police
had no reason to know that the purse did not belong to the consenting party because "there were
no exterior markings on the purse that should have alerted them to the fact that it belonged to
another person"); see also United States v. Romanelli, No. 98-50046, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS
29565, at *7 (9th Cir. Nov. 17, 1998) ("The box was unmarked and sitting at the foot of [the
consenting party's] bed. There was no outward indication that it belonged to anyone else. As a




of properly applying the obviousness standard, the term "lock" should
refer to any secured fastening mechanism requiring a key or combina-
tion, and the term "seal" should refer to any method of securing a
container other than those inherent to the container's design.219
While courts have occasionally disagreed about whether locked or
sealed containers obviously receive heightened Fourth Amendment
protection, 220 such containers necessitate further inquiry due to their
overt manifestations of privacy. In Katz, the Supreme Court found a
reasonable expectation of privacy when an individual demonstrated
''an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy . . . that society [was]
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.'" 2 21 Accordingly, the Supreme
Court has recognized that placing one's personal effects inside a
locked container manifests "an expectation that the contents would
remain free from public examination. No less than one who locks the
doors of his home against intruders, one who safeguards his personal
possessions in this manner is due the protection of the Fourth Amend-
ment Warrant Clause." 222 Locks, labels, and seals should give officers
pause because they clearly indicate an expectation that no one but the
container's owner would enjoy access to its contents. Even after ob-
taining open-ended, unlimited consent to search a residence, law en-
forcement cannot construe the resident's consent as obviously
extending to these types of containers because they lie outside the
scope of that consent.223
219. For example, a backpack's zipper, a purse's clasp, and a cigar box's magnetic band are all
inherent to the design of these containers.
220. Compare Commonwealth v. Sardone, No. 981073, 1999 Mass. Super. LEXIS 205, at *13
(Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 30, 1999) ("The fact that the knapsack was not secured by a lock, while a
relevant factor, is not determinative."), with United States v. Cork, No. 00-5099, 2001 U.S. App.
LEXIS 20443, at *19-20 (6th Cir. Sept. 6, 2001) ("While a sealed container or locked suitcase
may be entitled to a heightened expectation of privacy, here [the defendant] did not seal, tape,
or lock the shoebox." (citation omitted)), and Glenn v. Commonwealth, 654 S.E.2d 910, 915 (Va.
2008) ("Had the backpack borne [the defendant's] name or other identifying marks, . . . there
would likely be few circumstances where an objectively reasonable police officer could conclude
[the consenting party] had the authority to consent to a search of the bag.").
221. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
222. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977), overruled by California v. Acevedo, 500
U.S. 565, 579 (1991) (holding that police may open such a container only when they have proba-
ble cause to do so).
223. See, e.g., United States v. Basinski, 226 F.3d 829, 835 (7th Cir. 2000) ("Because a reasona-
ble person would be less likely to believe that a defendant granted free access to the contents of
locked containers, also relevant are the precautions taken to ensure privacy, such as locks or the
government's knowledge of the defendant's orders not to open the container."); United States v.
Presler, 610 F.2d 1206, 1213-14 (4th Cir. 1979) ("The very act of locking [two briefcases] and
retaining either the key or the combination to the locks on the two briefcases was an effective
expression of the defendant's expectation of privacy.").
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Law enforcement should treat locks, labels, and seals as the Su-
preme Court treated present, nonconsenting residents in Georgia v.
Randolph.2 2 4 There, the Court opined that no reasonable person
would construe one resident's invitation to enter as sufficient against
another's express refusal.2 25 Therefore, officers must yield to a pre-
sent, nonconsenting resident even when another resident openly con-
sents to a search. In the same way, police should not have the
authority to break into a locked, labeled, or sealed container because
the lock, label, or seal implies nonconsent. Like a present, noncon-
senting resident, the container manifests its owner's nonconsent in di-
rect contradiction to a consenting party's open-ended permission.
2. Positive Knowledge
Positive knowledge that a container does not belong to the con-
senting party also constitutes obviousness. While this notion seems
self-evident, there are peripheral forms of positive knowledge that
have caused some difficulty in the courts. For example, most would
agree that a consenting party's bald assertion that a backpack belongs
to another constitutes positive knowledge, but what if the consenting
party made no such statement and the officer had seen another indi-
vidual carrying a similar, if not the same, backpack earlier that day? 226
As courts applying the obviousness standard have held, inference is
not fact, and probability is not positive.227 When assessing the state of
mind of a reasonable officer during a search, courts should look to
what would have been objectively known and not what may have been
subjectively inferred.
The ambiguity and obviousness standards treat the positive knowl-
edge of law enforcement officers in significantly different manners.
While the obviousness standard requires police officers to discontinue
a consensual search when they know that a certain closed container
does not belong to the consenting party,228 the ambiguous standard
requires police officers to discontinue a consensual search until they
224. See Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
225. Id. at 113.
226. See United States v. Zapata-Tamallo, 833 F.2d 25, 27 (2d Cir. 1987).
227. See Glenn v. Commonwealth, 654 S.E.2d 910, 915-16 (Va. 2008) (noting that, even
though "[t]he backpack was located in a room that the police knew [the defendant] used," there
was nothing indicating that the backpack did not belong to his grandfather).
228. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 332 F.3d 1163, 1170 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding a search to
be unreasonable because the consenting party indicated which bedroom was occupied by the
defendant when initially providing her consent to search, adding that the defendant kept all of
his belongings in that bedroom).
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know that a closed container does belong to the consenting party.229
In adopting the obviousness standard, courts should only question
whether the police positively knew that a container did not belong to
the consenting party and make such knowledge an obvious barrier to
a closed-container search. While a consenting party may provide a
law enforcement officer with positive knowledge as to his lack of au-
thority over certain areas or containers, any other such knowledge
must stem from the nonconsenting party's obvious and exclusive own-
ership. Though such ownership may be overwhelmingly evident from
the circumstances, courts should not simply assume another party's
ownership ex post absent an obvious and objective determination of
the same ex ante.
This approach accords with the proper burdens placed upon police
officers and citizens.230 Before obtaining valid consent, law enforce-
ment must establish not only voluntariness, but also authority to con-
sent.231 After satisfying these requirements, the obviousness standard
extends that consent to any containers not obviously belonging to an-
other.232 Only when a consenting party freely indicates that an area
or container is within the exclusive possession of another will he have
obviously abdicated his authority over it to the point of granting posi-
tive knowledge to an officer.233
In sum, officers should be able to extend a consensual search to
closed containers when the officers do not have positive knowledge of
229. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 600 F.3d 678, 683 (6th Cir. 2010) (finding a search to be
unreasonable because the officers should have questioned the consenting party about her owner-
ship of a shoebox before opening it).
230. See supra notes 145-89 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 156-65 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 94-115 and accompanying text.
233. See Davis, 332 F.3d at 1166. United States v. Zapata-Tamallo is instructive as to this
approach, demonstrating how positive knowledge stems only from "obvious and exclusive" pos-
session in the absence of other obvious and objective indicia of ownership. See 833 F.2d 25 (2d
Cir. 1987). There, a resident host consented to the search of his guest's duffel bag, which the
searching officer had seen the guest carry into the apartment. Id. at 26-27. In upholding the
officer's search of the bag, the Second Circuit noted that there was "no evidence that [the defen-
dant] had an exclusive possessory interest in the bag. . . . Although a third party's consent to a
search is generally invalid when it is 'obvious' that the searched item belongs to a guest. [the
defendant] has failed to prove that the bag was 'obviously' his." Id. at 27 (citation omitted).
Zapata-Tamallo represents the outer limit of a finding of no positive knowledge. While the
officer saw the defendant carry the bag into the apartment, arguably establishing the defendant's
ownership over it, there was no indication of exclusive ownership. The bag was not marked or
labeled, and it did not manifest an expectation of privacy with a lock or seal. See id. Neither the
consenting party nor the defendant gave the officer any reason to believe that the bag was obvi-
ously not subject to mutual use. See also United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974).
Therefore, the court properly concluded that the defendant did not meet his burden of establish-
ing positive knowledge of obvious and exclusive ownership.
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another's ownership or privacy interest in the containers. Addition-
ally, officers' ability to search should be limited to only those contain-
ers that are not clearly labeled or sealed by some method other than
one inherent to the container's design. These relatively simple rules
will enable law enforcement to quickly and efficiently execute a lawful
search while minimizing intrusions upon the privacy of consenting and
nonconsenting citizens.234 However, while these rules can and should
universally apply to any conceivable container-whether it be a purse,
shoebox, or suitcase-it is important to note the tendency of some
courts to assign varying levels of privacy to certain containers in cer-
tain situations.235 To some extent, it is reasonable to note the greater
privacy interests that a suitcase or purse may enjoy over, say, a
shoebox. However, these tiered privacy regimes should be irrelevant
after an officer obtains open-ended consent to search a residence.
Such a hierarchy dilutes the strength of that consent, reducing it to a
mere threshold authorization that enables officers to look around un-
til they stumble upon anything with a lid. Absent a lock, label, seal, or
limiting instruction from the consenting party, the potentially sensitive
contents of any given container should not alter the unlimited nature
of freely given consent.
B. Policy Implications of the Obviousness Standard
The obviousness standard promotes the policy of quick and efficient
searches by refusing to place an improper and unreasonable burden
upon police officers. 236 Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is a balance
between effective law enforcement and the privacy interests of citi-
zens; it prevents government intrusion only when it is unreasonable,
234. Cf Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347 (2001) ("Often enough, the Fourth
Amendment has to be applied on the spur (and in the heat) of the moment, and the object in
implementing its command of reasonableness is to draw standards sufficiently clear and simple
to be applied with a fair prospect of surviving judicial second-guessing months and years after an
arrest or search is made. Courts attempting to strike a reasonable Fourth Amendment balance
thus credit the government's side with an essential interest in readily administrable rules.").
235. See, e.g., United States v. Taylor, 600 F.3d 678, 683 (6th Cir. 2010) ("A shoebox is conced-
edly not 'luggage.' . . ."); United States v. Block, 590 F.2d 535, 541 n.8 (4th Cir. 1978) ("Obvi-
ously not every 'enclosed space' within a room or other area-e.g., pockets in clothes, unsecured
shoeboxes, and the like-can claim independent status as objects capable of search not within
reach of the authorized area search.").
236. Cf Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1861 (2011) (declining to endorse a rule that "law
enforcement officers impermissibly create an exigency when they engage in conduct that would
cause a reasonable person to believe that entry is imminent and inevitable" because it would be
"extremely difficult for police officers to know how loudly they may announce their presence or
how forcefully they may knock on a door without running afoul of the police-created exigency
rule" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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while otherwise seeking to maximize its efficacy.237 When an individ-
ual consents to a search of his home, it is in the interests of both that
individual and police officers to execute a quick, thorough search
without lingering over every enclosed space. While the ambiguity
standard requires innumerable inquiries that would repeatedly halt a
lawful search-or possibly cause enough frustration that the con-
senting individual terminates the search altogether-the obviousness
standard allows officers to quickly retrieve evidence and remove
themselves from the premises.
As the Rodriguez Court observed, "[M]any situations which con-
front officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less
ambiguous, [and] room must be allowed for some mistakes on their
part." 238 There are numerous situations in which an officer may find
some modicum of ambiguity as to the ownership of a particular
container during the course of a lawful search. Does a man's shoebox
in a woman's closet require further inquiry? What about a cigar box
in the residence of a known nonsmoker, or two purses on a woman's
table? While the obviousness standard forgives small measures of am-
biguity in favor of conducting a speedy search of the residence, the
ambiguity standard requires repeated inquiry. In rejecting the ambi-
guity standard, the Seventh Circuit determined it to be "an impossible
burden on the police" because of the potentially endless dialogue it
generates between the consenting individual and the officer. 239
The obviousness standard allows for objective determinations. A
labeled container clearly belongs to another party; a locked or sealed
container manifests an expectation of privacy outside the scope of
open-ended consent; and positive knowledge about a container's own-
ership leaves no room for doubt. The ambiguity standard, however,
blurs these bright lines by miring courts in odd discussions about what
the peculiarities of the circumstances suggested 240 and charging them
237. See supra notes 20-24 and accompanying text.
238. Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 186 (1990) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338
U.S. 160, 176 (1949)).
239. See United States v. Melgar, 227 F.3d 1038, 1042 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[Such a] rule would
mean that [officers] could never search closed containers within a dwelling (including hotel
rooms) without asking the person whose consent is being given ex ante about every item they
might encounter.").
240. See, e.g., Taylor, 600 F.3d at 679-80 ("This closet was strewn with men's clothes, chil-
dren's clothes, and toys. On the floor of the closet, in a corner, the officers found a closed
shoebox with a label indicating that it was for a pair of Nike brand Air Jordan men's basketball
shoes, size ten-and-a-half. The shoebox was partially covered by a piece of men's clothing.").
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with the clairvoyant task of reading an officer's subjective intent.2 4 1
Such a standard is unmanageable for police, citizens, and the courts.
Finally, objective determinations lead to efficient, consensual
searches. Although the Fourth Amendment implicitly distrusts any
intrusion by the government, the Supreme Court has emphasized the
importance of a search pursuant to freely given consent. 242 The obvi-
ousness standard respects the nature of that open-ended consent and
does not require an officer to disassemble and reconstruct it to fit
what he may perceive to be an area of elevated privacy. As a result,
the interaction between the police and a consenting citizen is termi-
nated quickly, evidence is located efficiently, and law enforcement is
able to execute its duties effectively.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts should be wary about requiring law enforcement to termi-
nate consensual searches simply because the circumstances presented
some measure of ambiguity. The Supreme Court issued a rule of ob-
jective reasonableness in Illinois v. Rodriguez that governs an officer's
assessment of a resident's initial authority to consent, as well as the
scope of that consent. Courts that apply the ambiguity standard not
only misinterpret this mandate, but also place an unreasonable burden
upon law enforcement. Although courts have long required the con-
senting party to limit the scope of his consent, the ambiguity standard
requires special ex ante inquiry from any officer in an even mildly
ambiguous situation. In advocating for the obviousness standard, this
Comment urges courts to find an officer's continued search unreason-
able only when that officer had positive knowledge regarding a
container's ownership or if the container was clearly labeled, locked,
or sealed. A contrary rule only impedes law enforcement in the exe-
cution of its duties and extends indefinitely an otherwise speedy
search.
Frank J. Stretz*
241. See, e.g., United States v. Waller, 426 F.3d 838, 849 (6th Cir. 2005) ("Why would the
police open the suitcase if they reasonably believed it belonged to [the consenting party, as
opposed to the defendant]?").
242. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973).
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